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acquired in the future should be the separate

prop~

ertY of the Wife, and the reference to the agreement succeedingthecause of action was therefore dictum unnecessary to
.
'Inthelight of all the evidence it is not improbable that a
different judgment would have been reached had the er'rone!>us1y admittede~dence been excluded. Since the error
is therefore prejudicial the jUdgment should be reversed.
tlie'decisio~.

Edmonds, J., concurred.

[S~ F. No; 16772.
,

<

..

,.

In Bank. Nov. 2, 1942.J

•

D. ~. J.MUELLER, Appellant, v. ELBA' OIL COMPANY (a
I,' Partnership) et al., Respondents.
[la, Ibl Bankruptcy-Debts and Assets-Claims-Compromise.·ti,an;fuvol~t~.ba~ptcy proceeding involvfuga partnership, . a~ ord~r, .pUf.~uant to the trustee's petition·.to compromi!le and'~ ~lq.e ,:~otice, approving the compromise and .ad~
judging'the: diScharge of partners from all liability as general
p~tne.r~ 'o£", the~anlmiptfirm, is binding on a general. schedL i''Uled creditor ' who' had not filed a claim before the expiration
"oftheA;imetherefor, and it operates to relieve the partners
from.,theirpart,nership .liability although they had not, been
ii,[,J!;dju~a~4 ib.a~pt"where the offer of compromise was
,<,,:1. :~de~e~p?:~ e~~tion of the time for filing_claims, a~d where
,. !";' ~~ .. C~~P:t;9~e,. proceeding. w~s instituted prior to. the effecj,c':' 'tivil <la\eo,fth~~93~ amendments to the bankruptcy law. (See
:',:),~',:S8nkr?Act~,,~27; l1'U.S.C.A. 50.)
, "
.

~

L',':.l--.r,;.q' :'··J'odT';li'~'~'i

':'.:':; fO::

>

•

•
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'l~~~~l :!flr7T~~R,sa,nd ~sets-Claims-Compromise--Law Gov::'L,~~~ "c,*~e }~.38; ~mend.menFs t? the ba~kruptcy law .which
~.. gov~rnllroceedUlgs pending oll, Its effectIve date "so far as
;i·NrIp!acti~ablell.:(52'Statil. L.940,§ 6(b); 11 U.S.C..A.j 1941 Cum.
!),itt lPocket,Pt., '~der'§ 1) ~e inapplicable to a compromise prob11.ti(~eeding 1then).pending where the offer was made before the
! i e~.Qtiv~14a.te;;,gf,:the amendments and the amendments would
, IfQ<it~Pfir!'h~fii~::q~lU'to+, jurisdic~ion. to approve the offer of com'~~~'<jc~<;~~e~g~~~e,~~~s on whIch It was made.
,

l.~ntirlSe~ 6':~tJur~i809•.,

?~MCit;"Dij!::~Befe¥enceS:"[l-6,

10] Bankruptcy, § 12b; . [7] Con\tacts;,§·154r[81':Judgments, § 373; [9] Judgments, § 323.

'[3a-3c] Id .....:Debts and Assets-CIaims-Compromise,-Oollateral
A.ttack.-In a bankruptcy proceeding against a firm, an order
on a petition to compromise, which adjudges a discharge of
partners from all liability as such, is not subject to collateral
attack by reason of ambiguities in the petition, or inconsistencies between the petition and the order made thereon.
[4] ld.-Debts and Assets-:.Claims-Compromise-What Constitutes.-In a proceeding in bankruptcy to marshal assets. of
partners of a bankrupt firm, an offer of a specified amount· to
satisfy unsecured .creditors with the controlling objective of
securing a release of the partners did not constitute an attempted composition or arrangement within Bankr. Act, § 301
etseq. (11 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.), notwithstanding the use
therein of the term "composition of credtiors"; but it was an
offer of settlement by way of compromise by persons in the
positions of defendants in an adversary proceeding.
.
[5] ld.-Debts and .Assets-,.--ClaiJns-Compromise--Acceptance.-.
A trustee in bankruptcy has no power to alter conditions contained in an. offer of compromise. The offer must be accepted
in substantial compliance with the conditions or not at all.
[6] Id.-Debts and Assets-CIaim~Compromise-Controversy.
The mere fact that a trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to compel partners of a bankrupt firm to marshal their assets does
not make the fact or amount of net recovery ,for the partnership less controversial so as to preclude a compromise. In determiningthe advisability of compromise, the bankruptcy
court may consider the uncert'ainty and, cos~ of litigation, and
the sufficiency of the petition presented.
[7] Contracts-Interpretation-Law as Part of Contract.-The
bankruptcy law as it exists at the time. of an offer of comprO:mise in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding is as much a
part of .the offer as though .it were written therein.

of

[8] Judgments - Bes Judicata-Character.
Tribunal-Federal
Court.-A: final order of a referee in bankruptcy, impliedly
approved by the court, confirming a compromise anddischarging partners from liability as general partners of a bankrupt
firm; will be given full faith and credit in a state action as
against the creditor suing a partner on a debt covered by the
order. (See Bankr. Act § 1 (9); 11 U.S.C.A. § 1(9).)
[9] ld.-Collateral Attack---':Errors.-Jurisdictionis but the power
to hear and determine, and docs not depend upon the correctness of the decision made.

[10] Bankruptcy-Debts and Assets.-Claims-Compromise--Ool(7]' See 6 CalJur. 310.

)';
I

190

MUELLER

v.

ELBA OIL

CO.

[21 C.2d

MUELLER

v.

ELBA OIL

[21 0.2d 188]

'"ia.teral Attack.~'[pan aC,tion against partners on a firm indebt-

,,'" 'nesj, an attack o'n,an order of a referee in bankruptcy approv-

,fllg:acoJnpromis~,~~d,releasiI!g partners from liability as such
:, \ .",is,;a~~ollate~8:1att~clk which fails where the petition for com.
~~, i ;p~q~j.se'Wal! ,J~i~~9tipnally adequate, where the ordo; was
, ',' not void ,o;n:~¥s' f~~!3;,.~rid where there was no suggestIOn of
fraud.
"
'~;~i;.~<,:,l ...'

Nov. 1942]

. •:·f

\ ::""",,: . . l.l."ii~·~'1- :..

'!APPEALfrom a' judgment of the Superior Court of Mont~r~y:.'Co,Urity: .Henry:·,~;.Jorgensen, Judge. Affirmed.

'Actionto;reco~er ,for goods sold and delivered. Judgment
for defena:ants affirmed.
'Mueller & weStover for Appellant.
Rosendale, Thomas & Muller for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J. pro tem.-This is an appeal by plaintiff from
a Jlldgment' for defendants Frank Raiterand LouisOleari
in an itctioIi to recover the price of goods sold and delivered
by plaintiff's assignor to the Elba Oil Company, a partnership, in which the two defendants above named were among
the general partners. Except as otherwise specifically noted
the term plaintiff will hereinafter be used in referring either
to plaintiff or to his assignor and the term defendants will
be understood as deSignating the respondents Raiter and
Oleari. All italics within quotations are added.
As previously mentioned the merchandise was sold to the
partnership. The debt was unsecured. Subsequent to the sale
but prior to trial of this action the partnership, upon involuntary petition, was adjudicated It bankrupt and in due course
was Q,ischarge,d from it.~ scheduled debts, including that sued
on here, In, course of administration of the bankrupt partnershipestate.thetrustce instituted a proceeding to marshal the
individual assets of the general partners. Such proceeding, or
morc teclulically; the controversy arising out of it, was com'promisedllpon terms approved by order of the bankruptcy
-court. The compromise was predicated on, among other things,
a disclosure of the assets and personal liabilities of the defendants. Its torms, asestabl,ished by the order, included payment
'Of $7,500'incash, advanced by a bank for the defendants, to
the trustee and the reciprocal consideration "that upon receipt

Co.
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of said sum of $7500.00 by the Trustee that the said Frank G.
Raiter and Louis G. Oleari, and each of them are fully and
completely released and discharged from any and all claims,
demands, liability, causes of action or judgments against them
or either of them, as general partners of the above-named
bankrupt!' It is stipUlated that "the sum of l~7,500, was ...
received, accepted, and expended by said Trustee in accordance with said order."
This action is predicated on the personal liability of defendants as general partners. Theil: defense, is based on two
propositions: (1) Release and discharge effected by the order
of the bankruptcy court above mentioned; (2) discharge in
bankruptcy of the individual partners as legally incident to
formal discharge of the bankrupt partnership. The case was
tried upon an agreed statement of facts which the trial court
impliedly found to sustain the defenses above mentioned.
Plaintiff challenges both of the defenses, contending that the
C'rder of the bankruptcy court.in the compromise proceeding
was void as to plaintiff and that the discharge of the partnership, did not operate to discharge the defendants individually.
[la] We find that the determination of but one major question
is essential to our decision: Is the order of the bankruptcy court,
approving the compromise and releasing the defendants, binding on plaintiff? In reaching an affirmative conclusion we survey the pertinent provisions of the bankruptcy law as it stood
both before and after the 1938 amendments, together with
appropriate decisions of both federal and state courts throwing light on the jurisdictional questions involved. In our
discussion of the Bankruptcy Act and of federal court decisions construing its provisions we are not to be understood
LS assuming in any instance to declare what constitutes the
" rue rule or better practice on a federal question in a federal
,ribunal. Weare interested not at all in determining what
constitutes in a federal court a proper as distinguished from
an erroneous ruling. We are concerned only with noting rulings authoritatively made showing the jurisdictional compass
of the court.
For clarity and brevity of presentation the fOliowing chronology of facts is convenient:
Involuntary Petition in Bankruptcy filed
Dec. 31, 1937
(against Elba Oil Company naming defe:qdants among general partners ).
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Partnership adjudicated bankrupt. (Sched.
dule' filed in due course c9rrcctly and ade·
r ..' ...
quately listing debt due plaintiff's assignor.)
Ma.~ch 11,1938 Notice given all creditors. (In due course
trustee 'Was regularly elected, appointed, and
. qualified.)
TruStee filed petition for marshaling assets
"April 4, 1938
...,.
of partners;
April 7, 1938. Order to show cause on petition to marshal
assets issued and served on defendants.
April 14, 1938 Second order to show cause on petition to
marshal assets issued and served on defend, ,
anw;'
.
June 28, 1938
Offer'on behalf of defendants tocompromlSe
marshal'assets controversy (by paying $7,500
; totrnstee) submitted to trustee.
Sept. 22, 19.38 .. 'The 1938 amendments to the bankruptcy act
'became generally effective.'
,
'Dec;' 19, 1938"Thirdorder to show cause on petition to·
• "
"
1 "ma~hal assets issued and served (contro.
" 'versy 'still continuing).
Jan. 30~ 1939' ... Trustee filed in bankruptcy court his petition
. . " ~", to cOIllpromise the controversy, based on th<l.
. offer of June 28, 1938. (Petition regularly
. 8~t' 'for hearing on February 14, 1939, a,nd
" 'due'notice given all creditors including plain.• ;';
" " , ti:fi;~~ignor~)
,
Fck14' '1939 ,. ;'Meeting of creditors; order of court fo~ com·
';,
. . 1 " ; I,
: I 'promise of controversy and release of de.
i .-" .. "
"fe~dants made and entered. (This termi.
I""i'"
i
"the marshal assets proceeding; the
',,! ~ ""~,,, ; $7~500 was then accepted by trustee and
l.."? :~.'! '" '''': o~ended pursuant to court order; the order
l";u/ . " . ,'was not appealed from and b~came :(inal.)
.¥~lwiJ};)9~f,~'T,~f \~artne~ship. :vas ~ischarged' an~ its
',i . ,"'
" , : . ba,nkruptcy admInIstratIOn closed. (ThIS or·
<~";",l"
>:' ., der :implies approval of and reliance upo~
, . the compromise-termination. of the marsIllil
-Ln.,: 'i' '."" i.' ".i:', assets proceeding and the receipt and expen.
diture of the $7,500 thereby obtained.)
'5, 'The oftel' ~f 'compromise' in the marshal assets proceeding.
ibsofaio a.s it was reduced to writing, was submitted by a bank
Jan. 4, 1938
.,

~

,

:'.

;

,'.J-.

,,':

"

'J
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on behalf' of the defendants, w~s addressed to the trustee, and
was in words and figures as follows:
.
"Enclosed herewith is oqr cashier's check in the sum of
$7500.00, dated June 28, 1938, numbered,.7794 and payable
to you as trustee of the Estate of Elba Oil Company, bankrupt. This check is delivered to you for the sole and exclusive
purpose of using the same and the proeeeds thereof for effect·
ing, completing, and paying a composition of creditors of
said Elba Oil Company, No. 31187·Y,of the District Court
of the United States, Southern District; Central' Division,
according to the terms and conditions of offer heretofore made
or hereafter to be made by our clients, Frank E. Raiter and
LouisG. Oleari, as copartners .of said Elba Oil Company.
. "We 'are advised that the terms and conditions of said
offer. are or will be as follows: (1;) that all sec-qred ereditors' of said Elba Oil Company shall take and accept all prop"
erties described in their respective .securities in fullsatisfac~,
tion and dischargE;) of the debtSsec1;lred thereby; (2) it.hat'aU
unsecured cr'editors and all trllstecs' fees,' attorneys'feeB,
r~ceivers' fees, costs, etc., shall be tully satisfied and p~idout
of said sum of $7500; and (3) that each creditor of said Elba
Oil Company shall execute in writing a full and' complete
release and discharge of our clients,. Frank E. Raitel~ ahd
Louis G. Qleari, or and from any and all individual liability
to ca.ch of said creditors.. If YOll effe~t; Complete, and obtain
confirmation of a composition of creditors upon such.' terms
and conditions, you are. authQrized to use. the. proceeds of
.said check for payment or said fees, costs,; clflims of unsc~.
cured. creditors, etc., but for ~o other purpose, andin the
event th&:t you are unable to effect; complete,andobtain con~
firmationof such composition within three lIionthsfrom the
date hereof, you shall return said sum of. $7500.00. to us
without deduction of any kind whatsoevQ~.. ,UfJ,Uland unless
said compos#iofJ, shallQc so effected,completed, and confirmationthereof obtained, said sum of $7500.00 shall.be and
remain the property of the 1,mdersigned."
While such offer of compromise uses the words "composition of creditors" in referring to the purpose of the offer,
the ends to be attained.and the conditions for payment
the
money are specified as (1) that all. secured creditors of the
partnership shall accept their securjties in full satisfaction
or the secured debts;. (2) that all unsecnred creditors and
fees and costs "shall be fully satisfied and paid out olsaid,

of
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creditor of said Elba Oil
Company Sh8llexecute ill wrltlI~g a full and complete re~
lease and discha:cge of . . . FrankE. Raiter and Louis G;
)OI~ari; of ~a 'fro:tll ariy and all individual liability to each
ofSaiClcreditQrs.'" In other words, ,the ultimate and, con, trolling"objectiv~ of the, offer to pay $7,500 apparently was
the', compI,ete l'eleaso or discharge of the defendants Raiter
arid Oleari from individual liability for debts of the partnership. ,It was not ,sought to secure their release or discharge
from theirindivUual debts outside of their partnership liability.
It ,has been held that technically a partnerspip is an entit;v
which'may be adjudged bankrupt irrespective of any adjudication of the' individual, partners as bankrupts (Luse v.
Peters" (1933)219 Oa1:625, 629 [28 P.2d357]; see cases
cited in note 7, annotations to § 23, tit. 11, U.S.C.A.), although it has been said to he error or at least incongruous,
to adjudicate 'and discharge a partnership firm witJ:J.out' ade
jUdication alld'discharge of the individual partners (see note
[hereinafter quoted.in part] on p. 669 of L;R.A. 1915F and
cases ·cited). In' any event, it was authoritatively held that
under the Bankruptcy Act prior to the 1938 amendments the
adjudication ofaflrm gave the bankruptcy court jurisdiction 'to take over the separate estates of the partners and to
admiilister them so far as necessary to complete settlement,
of: the 'partnership estate. (Dickas v. Barnes~ (1905, 60ir.)
140'F~ 849 [72 C.C.A. 261, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 6l$4, 656, 15' Am,
'Bankl'; Rep: 566] il!rancis v. McNeal, (19;13) 228 U.S. 695,
[33 S,Ct:701, 57 L.Ed. 1029, L.R.A. 1915E, 706], affirming
(Pa.,: 1911) ,186 F. 481 [108 C.C.A. 459, 26 Am. Bankt'.
Rep. 555].)
An' individual partner's property when taken over must
be applied first, to the payment of his individual debts
and the surplus, but only the surplus, is then added to the
partnerShipassetsj and if any surplus of partnership property remains after paying its debts such surplus is added to
the ,assets, of the, individual partners in the, proPo.rtion, o~
their respective interests in the partnership. (§ 23 (f), tit. 11,
U.S.C.A:; becoming §23(g), tit. 11, in 1938, L§ 5, Bank-i'.
Act].) ;, ,Joiritiy ,in, the partnership proceeding, as the law
now,stands, any number of general partners 'may be adjudicatedbankrupt. (§ 23(a), tit. 11, U.S.C.A. [§ 5, Bankr.
Actl;) Those;.who are so adjudicated and who otherwise
eomplywith, the: bankruptcy law are entitled to gischarl;\'e '

'

•
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from their individual as well as from partnership debts.
(§ 23(j), tit.H, U:S.C.A. [§,5, Bankr, Act.1.)
Prior to the effective date Of the 1938 amendments to the
Bankruptcy .Act it was held by high' authority that partners
who were not individually adjudicated bankrupt were" nevertheless, by the discharge of the bankrupt firm, themselves
discharged from further liability for partnership debts.
(Abbott v. Anderson, (1914) 265 Ill. 285, [106 N.E. 782,
L.R.A. 1915F668]; see, also, Francis v. McNeaZ. supra.
(1913) 228 U.S. 695 [33 S.Ot. 701, 57 L.Ed. 1029, L.RA.
1915E 706].) In the note on page 669 of L.R.A. 1915F,
annot~tiIigAbbott v. Anderson, s~£pra, after referring to
Francis v. McN cal, s~£pra, it is stated that "The law can
therefore be regarded as settled that a discharge of apart"
nership in bankruptcy discharges the members thereof from
liability for firm debts, whether the bankruptcy court ,brought
in the members of the firm and their pro.pertyorerroneolisly
discharged the firm as an entity without an a.d~udication ,of the
individual members." It will also. be noted tha.t the Supreme
Court in Francis v. McNeal, supra,overruled In re Bertenshaw, (1907,8 Cir.) 157 F. 363 [85C.C.A. 61, 13 Ann. Cas.
986, 17 L.R.A.N.S. 886], in its earlier arguendo ruling (at
page 369 o.f 157 F:) that "thc creditors of the partnership
may subject the individual property o.f the unadjudicated
partners to the payment o.f their debts befo.re during or after'
the bankruptcypro.ceedings, by actions at law, by suits in
equity or by other proceedings." Furthermore, as to the jurisdiction and Po.wer of the bankruptcy co.urt to discharge partners from liability fo.r firm debts altho.ugh they remain technically unadjudicated as bankrupts, the Circuit Court of
Appeals; Eighth Circuit, in Armstrong v. Not'ris, (1917, 8
Cir.) 247 Ji'. 253,255 [159 C.C.A. 347J, said: "The bankruptcy
of their firm made Bro.wn and Norris as individuals parties to
the proceeding, so far as their rights and liabilities as debtors
were necessarily involved in its scope an,d effect. They were in
court jointly and severally~ Thepartnersliipd:ebts were their
debts. Their iudividual liability there£qr was primary and
direct, not collateral. The partnership property, that was administered was their property, for a deficiency ,of which to
pay the debts their individual estates, if anY,were bound; and
were, subject to the jurisdiction of the court: in that~roceed
ing for equitable marshaling and application•••• Ordinarily
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,it is tfue'ihat, a ,discharge in bankruptcy implie~ a prior ad-

'judication'~f the, ~~!SOP q.ischarged, but t~e rule should not
',', be: applied t99 lit~raUy. '. When a partnershIp alone .has ,been
~djiidgedbanlqjipt, the' individual partne~s and thel~e~ta~es
~redraWA:,ipto the'l?to~eedingand are sUbJ.e?t to the Jurls~c~
tlon of the CQurt· aJlQwhen all the condItIons and reqUlre,'me~ts of the BariijilptcyAct have been observed9Y them,
jointly'and severally, there. is no sound reason why the c~llrt
should not : upon' their application in the same proceedm~,
4ischar~e,:,ih~m: .ftom, ,fnrtherliability for the ,partnershIp
'dt-'"
~I./ts.,
. ' , ; '.' ,
,

.:;'T4~ 19,3B.jamen;dnl.~nts. to the 'bankruptcy law ( § 2~(j), tit:

il;.U,S:(tA{t§"5;.B~nkr.Act]) changed the rule qU?te~ ~bove

from' L;R.A.)9l5F; 'page 669, as to the effect on mdlYJ.dual
.,partnerS"'l~~bilitf;6r a: discharge of the par~nership, by~~o ..
~viding'iha~;'·~,T:htH,~:4>.charge of a partnershIp shall not dlS.charge':tl1Edndi'vldual general partners thereof from the ;part'nershipM,'bts:Ageneral partner adjudged a bankrupt elthe.r
'hitl. join:()i'jsepara~~:,proceeding may, pursuan~ to theprO~I
sions of thi$ title;· ob~aina di$~harge from both hIS partnerShl?
8nddndividuaF debts. " Assuming for the purposes of thIS
opinion/bqt'llot holding, that ~h~ ~mendment.just quoted is of
'j:p,risclictionatsignmc,anceas hmltmg orde~mg the power. of
,the; banki'uptcy 'court '. in: t;he' premises, we gIve consIderatlOn
to !its .applicability.· '
..·[aalAs'totl),e applicability of th.e 1938 amendments to the
present'coritroversy it is to be'recognized that normall~ where
any provision relating to discharge is amended, the rIght to
'dischat~e ;~iUJ)egoverned by the law as it stands at the ti~e
the petition ,for discharge is ,filed or the court acts o~ It
(Farihers"Siw. Ban.k of Grimes; Iowa v. Allen, (1930, 8 Clr.)
41 F.2d,208, 210 ; In re'Farruw, (1939, D.C., Cal.) 28 F.Supp.
9:10) but it is also to be'noted that in enacting the 1938
'bankruptcy legisia:tio~ Congress prescribed a conditional savirii'clau.se,as to'pendingproceedings, making applica?ilit.y. of
the new law to, such 'proceedings dependent on practwab~l~ty.
The clause is as follows (§ 6b, 52 Stat. 940, see annotation to
§l; tit; 11,U;S.C.A., 1941 Cumlllative Annual Pocket Part,
14): "Except '~ otherwise provided in this amendatory
Act, the' provisions of this amendatory Act .shall gove~n proceedings'so far as practicable in cases pend~ngwhen ~t takes
effect; but ,proceedings in cases then pending to WhICh the
I

p;'
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provisions of thisam~ndatoryAct are not applicable shall ,be
disposeq, of conformably to the provisions of said Act approved
July 1, 1898,' and the Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto." It also must be remembered that the Bankruptcy Act is to be interpreted and administered liberally ill
favor ofthe bankrupt (Morris Plan B,ank of Richmond, Va. v.
Henderson, (1932, D.C., N.C.) 57 F.2d 326, 327 i Farmers'
Sav. Bank of Grimes, Iowa v. Allen, supra, (1930, 8 Cir.) 41
F.2d 208,212).
From whathas been said as to the law prior to the effective.
date of the 1938 amendments to the Bank:rupt~y Act (Septem. ber ~~, 1938) it cleady appears that at ~e time the initially pertinent .proceeding (the petition to mars~al assetS of .the q,e~
fenqants) was filed (April 4, 1938) anq likewise at the tim,e
(June 28, 193'8) of the making of the offer to compromise
the controversy represented or precipitated by s\lch petition,
the bankruptcy court had jurisdictioIi and authority to discharge these defenda:Q.ts from liability for the partnership
debts without the necessity of their being adjudica.ted bankrupt and if the local bankruptcy courts were following the
rule stated, in the note on page 669 ofL. R.A. 1915F, above
quoted; the discharge of the firm during that period would
have' impliedly and effectively discharge4 these defendants
:from liability for firm debts. Againwe state that we are n()t
holding that .the L.RA. 1915F rule was the only' holding the
bankruptcy court could have made. We are cognizant of sucll
decisions a.s First Nat. Banko! Herkimer v. Poland Union,
(1940;2 Cir.) 109 F.2d 54, wherein it is asserted in effect
(p. 57) .that the weight of. authority denies discharge to an
unadjtidicated partner even though' his assets ma.y be seized
by the firm trustee. 'l'he only proposition which we are concerned iJl depicting is that indubItably the bankruptcy court
had jurisdiction,whether properly or erroneously,to release
or discharge individual 'partners from firm debts without' the
formality of adjudication of the .partners.
At the time the petition to marshal assets was filed' and
at the time of the compromise offer, section 27 of the Bankruptcy Act (§ 50, tit. 11, U.S.C.A.) provided that "The trustee may, with the approval of the court, compromise any controversy arising in: the administration of the estate:'tlpon such
terms as he may deem for the best inter~ts of the estate;"
. No material change was made in this' section of the act in
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1938. In reliance upon this section and apparently in the
light of the law as it e:risted at the time the petition ~o marShill assets was' filed and likewise as it stood at the tune the
~ompromliie offer was made, the trustee on January 30, ~9~9,
fUedhi!! petitio!!. to compromise the controve~sy. Such p~~ItlOn
is entitled "In the District Court of the UnIted States, and
is denominated "'Petition to Compromise Controversy." It
alleges the appointment and qualification of the t~ust.ee.'the
filing of the Pfiltition to marshal the assets of the mdIvIdual
partners, including defendants, the issuance of the several
orders to show cause, the discussion between counsel for the
parties, C?f the matters Plvolved ; that "the assets of ~ai~ ~~r-.
so~· [defendants] we,re d4;,closed, and the personal lIabilItIes
of said persoris were likewise made known; that from the
iriformation'receivedby your petitioner it appears that the
'ValU:e oft1ie~ssets of said persons after the liquidation of the
persoiuilllabilities 9f said persons would amount to practically
nQthing."·rtis·.f~rthera:verred in such petition to compromise
thB.t "your petitioner recommended that if the sum of $7500.00
'was paid over to the Trustee herein in full arid complete settlement
,
.. , release and discharge of the individual liability of
said Frank E. Raiter and Louis G. O'Leari to the c;reditors of
'the above entitled bankrupt, your petitioner would present to
the cou;rt a petition based thereon to compromise the contI:oversy; ... that your petitioner is informed and believes, and
therefore alleges, that said sum is being advanced by said [a]
'bank for and on behalf. of said Frank E. Raiter and Louis G.
O'Lcari.'i A'further allegation is that" a basis of compromise
has ' be~n arrived at between [sic] all of the parties to the
'litigation hereinabove .set forth." As grounds for the com:i)l'omis~ arid' ,hldicative of the character of the co;ntrov~rs!
which 'existed it is alleged "That your Trustee beheves It IS
;for't'he 'hOst kterests of the creditors of this estate that the
,cgm:proi#s~'heielribe approved for ~he reason that it is doubtful thalthe estate herem ~n realIze any greater sum than
,that. whJCA ,js being paid' by the said' Frank E. Rai~er ~nd
LoUisG. Q'Leari from any order that may be made dIrectmg
,th'erii t~'. tui-p. ,9yertlleir assets to the Trustee herein. to marshal
the' s,aIile. ,Th.e.rc' is also ,some doubt as to the abU~ty of your
~r,us~ee; t,~;p~~,yai1 in the sa~d proceeding to marsha~ the ~sets
;of' the said Frank E. ,Raiter and Louis G. o'Lean That the
,~cc~~ta~~e:,.Qf~4.e,co~VJ'omil;;e at this time will eliminate costly
'
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and long drawn out litigation and will redound for the benefit
of the creditors of this estate."
[3a] The allegations of the petition for compromise so far as
recited up to this point are consistent with the object of the
offer which· was made by defendants-their complete release
or discharge from firm debts-but unfortunately it contai~
another allegation which is inconsistent with thegeiieral plan
and which is dwelt upon strongly by the plaintiff. Such allegation is that" Said controversy may be compromised upon the
.
following basis, to-wit:
"That in consideration of an order being made and entered
herein, wherein and whereby Frank E. Raiter and Louis G.
O'Leatj are fully and completely relea~ed and discharged of
and from any and all individual liabilities to each and every
one of the creditors who have filed claimsin the,above entitled
bankruptcy proceedings, being the Elba Oil Company, a co'partnership; .the said Frank E. Raiter and Louis G. O'Leari
will, thiough the Monterey County Trust & Savings Bank, pay
to the Trustee herein the sum of $7500.00."
Following the same inconsistency the prayer of the petition,
in addition to asking that notice be sent to creditors and
that an order be made authorizing the. compromise, requests
"an order made and' entered herein fully and completely
releasing and d.ischarging the said Frank E. Raiter and Louis
G.O'Leari of and from any and all in,dividual liabilities to
each Rndevery one of the creditors who have filed claims in
the above entith.'d bankrupt estate." Plaintiff's claim, although
duly scheduled by the' bankrupt part1,lership, was, no.tfiled
or proved 'by plaintitIol:' his assIgnor, and at the date the petition for compromise was filed (J!'tn. 30, 1939) t:b.e, time for
filing creditors'claims had expired' ,(§ 93(n),· tit. 11,
U.S.C.A.)~ TllO stipulation of facts shows "'that said petition
for compromise was duly .and rfgularly set down for hearing
... and due notice of said hearing was Ullliledand given to
of said Elba Oil Co-r;lpari.y, incl1idlng'~
plaintiff's
all creditors
,
..
.'
'.
aSsignor.
.
Upon the aboved~cribedpetition the matter Came on regularly for hearing in the bankruptcy- couft and the referee
prop~r1y took cognh':3u<'c.' of theE+ctualterms of the compromise offer. Appal'r.ntly the iP.COifsistericies in the petition
were i~norcd, as noamclldmt'nt thereto, appears to have been
made, and an order was made which includes the following
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IS HEREBY ORDERFmthat'said' cOllJ.prOmli!e is approved and confirined, and
the, 'Trustee 'is 'authorized and directed to compromise said
~RRli:~~~~~Y)Y',¥F'~rp~~g tJ1es~rn ,of $750?00, p~id to. said,
Trustee for: and on behalf of Frank E. Rruter and LoUIS <J.
o\l~~fi,";~P9n'-:CW~#Pp:1;~~tsaid Frank E. Raiter and Louis,
,(j!: r., , : ' '~~''.' :f.el~~ed
from any .
and
all liability which may
" \ r !-'! ': . , ;' .... \
'
.
.
o:r~~~~ht ~;~~t;~~~~~ th,em, or either of them as general partn:e.rs oftheaboye-;~amed bankrupt.
,
':Nl'.1.":r.F:F,~'l':e:ER,O,RDERED that upon receipt of said,
'~~,9f,,~}~9.0;~QJ)r,~h!lrrustee that the said Frank G. Raiter
~?,,~:po:1lls. ~" W~~~ a,nq each of them are fully and, com• • ~ '>:

I.

bleart
.~

,

,~.

'~/g1,fZ.~!~f,!~~fflf,4;}~n'a:f/!~ffc~,arge~ from. any and all c~aims, de-,

rtj.q,n'd$;:l$aQ$J~P1J,caU$esof actwn or 3udgrnents aga~nst them
partners of the above~named'

Oi:'e,#lJ,e/:ol,')1i.e#: ,'?;'J' general

bililkrut.'"

'I,

'.' ,', ',"

'

,

-i:/f¥~ ~~t~(~i(;~~~~~nf9~ fact.<;

further establishes that no

a~:er~i;vv~,~~;e8-ha~dthat the order above quoted fr,01l1 has

become fiiial f that, tlie$7,50Q was accepted by the trustee a.nd
~ei14~,d p,~~~~lltto the order; an~ that the paftnership was
dJs.1:l,harg~~, W. ;p,!<Ii~rllPtcy. The ~Ischarge recItel;! that the
ftElba
OO:)npany,a copartnerslup, composed of ... Joseph
'E;'Barfett,'J;'S;pees,Louis O'Leari and F. E. Raiter ... had
been ~uly adjudged a bankrupt, under the Acts of Congress
relating tQ bankruptcy, an<i appears to have conformed to all
,the requi1:eznents of law in that behalf."
, [4] Proba1)ly jnspired by the use of the term" composition of
creditors" in the compromise offer of June 28, 1938, there
has been some argument between the opposing parties on this
appeal as' to whether the proceeding to marshal assets of
the' defendants and th", compromise proceeding based thereon,
were not in law ,~hat tlIey appear to be but, combined with
the oifer, toget1:).er constituted either a never-properly-instituted attempt at a. composition of creditors under the thenexisting'aectio;nS 12 and 74 (§§ 30 and 202, tit. 11, U.S.C.A.)
of the Bankruptcy Act (sections now recast and incorporated
as far asperti,nent here in chapter 11, title 11, U.S.C.A.
(§§ 301~;399,: 'Battkr. Act], dealing with arrangements) or a
preniatur~ly,commenced or inept effort to achieve an "arrangement'.' 'pursuant to the' provisions of chapter 11, title 11,
U;S.C.A. '(see, pa,rticularly, §§ 721, et seq., tit. 11, U.S.C.A.
[§l321, ~t B~q~l- Bankr. Act]) as amended in 1938. A reading

o.n

,;, .I.• :.
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of the sections above cited makes it apparent that the proceedinO's here involved were not designed to, and did not,
o
.
.
'.
constitute either a composition or an arrangement. Certamly
under the law prior to the 1938 amendments the def(;mdants
,could have filed composition proceedings (§ 202, tit. 11,
U.S.C.A. [§ 74, Bankr. Act]) and would have been entitled to
conclude them under that law (§ 799(3), tit. 11, U.S.C.A.
[§ 399(3), 13ankr. Act]) and like"iise, subsequent to the effective date of the 1938 legislation, the defendants could have
filed a, petition for an arrangement pursuant to the provisions
of section 721, title 11, U.S.C.A. (§ 321, Bankr. Act). But
the defendants did not elect to institute any such proceedings.
Jurisdictionally, they were no-erequired so to do. Whether 'it
would 'have been better practice for them to have pursued one
of tho~e courses we need not speculate. The fact is that they
were, placed in the position of defendants in an adversary
proceeding~the petition to marshal their. assets in the partnership bankruptcy administration-and they offered a settlement by ~ayo£ compromise, upon terms which the bankruptcy court 'had jurisdiction to entertain.
So far as due process of lawis concerned, it does not appear
that plaintiff has been deprived of any right by any misapprehension ':that the compromise proceeding was in fact a compo~ition or arrangement proceeding. Its character as a com"
promise proceeding is apparent upon mere inspection of the
petition; .the petition is that of the trustee, not that of the
defendants or of the bankrupt firm; the substance of the
petition obviously seeks compromise and does not purport
to set forth the allegations specifically required by the Bankruptcy Act to be contained in a petition for composition or
arrangement. (See sections cited st£pra in reference to "com'position "and "arrangement.") Furthermore, in the agreed
.statement of facts plaintiff stipulates "that on or about the
28th day of June, 1938, defendants . . . made unto said
Trustee, and throug-h said Trustee to the creditors of said
bankrupt, an offer of compromise andcornposition, the terms
of which are set forth in Exhibit '4' ... ; that thereafter ...
said Trustee filed in said Court and matter his petition to
compromise the controversy between said Trustee and said
def~ndants.. " ."
.
At the date when the pctition to compromise was filed .. and.
like~ise when it 'was acted upon, section 50, title 11, U.S.C.A.

:,

202

MUELLER

v.

ELBA OIL

CO.

[21 C.2d

(§ 27, Bankr. Act), previously herein quoted in its pre-193S
.fo~ and which as mentioned above was not amended in 1938

. in any respect material to our consideration, declared· that
,"The receiver o.~ trustee may, with the apprQval of the court,
compromise any controversy arising in the administration of
the estate upon such terms as he may deem for the best interest of the.. estate. " Under this section the bankruptcy court
had powcr to .dispose of claims or assets of the bankrupt, of
d9ub~ful vaJue, in ap.expeditious manner, other than in the
•usual. and .0.rdinarY manner prescribed by statute for marshal-·
ing the assets ofa bankruPtcstate (Scott v. Jones, (1941, 10
"Cil·.),t18,r~2d.3q, 31). In Hamilton-Brown Shoe 00. et al.
:v. Ben L,Berwa~dShoeao.,(1925, 5Cir.) 10 F.2d 275, there
'wasil, factual situation very similar to that which was before
the bankruptcy cO.W't here. It differed to the extent that in
the cited case the sUing .creditors claimed personal liability
onthe part of the defendants not only on account of unpaid
stock subscrip'tions, which could have been recovered in the
bankru.p~cy administration by the trustee, the same as the
personalliabiliti~s of defendants as partners could have been
: enforced by the trustee her.!), but also in the cited case there
was a claim against the defendants arising out of their activi.
,tieS as officers o~ a bankrupt corporation. The liability of the
defendants in that case as officers of the corporation was personal to certain. creditors and could not have been enforced
by the!rl¥ltee..tn banln~upt~y.· The bankruptcy court therefore
qid not.4aye j),~wer'to release what it did not have jurisdic"
.~o;n. Q:ver;hut .insofar as the facts before it were similar to our
·~a.se, ;the, Circuit, Court of Appeals said (p. 276): "It may
'becopc~deg; that. the trustee may, with the appr~val of the
c()urt,compromise any controversy concerning thtJ bankrupt
'~tate, an,q. for this he represents all of the creditors under the
'~II;W:"; ~llnli·.~oWd !b~ .his claim for the unpaid portions of the
)tocksubs~J.'iptions and his right of action to set aside a
:p;r,eferen;~~~;,(:Ba.nkruPtcy Act, Sec. 27 [Compo St., Sec. 9611].)
Jf~~,prQ,~~~Il:gS,m.,this .case to that cxtent are 'regular,and
·.:wo~d :b(l,hiJ:I.ding;pl} appellants, if that wore aU."
.\,\·[lb}Thl;l plirlntifI's assilIDor was a scheduled creditor. Notice
~9~el/3()mpr.oIIiise proceeding was given as required by section
:94;su1,ldivjsion 8.,(3) and (6), title 11, U.S.C.A. (§ 58, subd.
, ,.a,.(3),;(6)1Banlt:f,:A.ct.) Such assignor had a right to appear
·'lQldconiest the proceeding even though no claim had beeu
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filed and the time for filiug claims had expired. Furthermore
thc off\!r of compromise was made bt'fore the time for filing
claims had expired. It was made to the trustee, who, as stated
in the above quutation from Hu,miUon-Brown Shoo Oo~ et al.
V. Ben L. B61'wald Shoe 00., represented all of the cred·itors.
[5] SHch offer clearly stated the conditions on which it was
made. The trustee could not alter those conditions and, as also
held in substance in the cas!' last cited, at page 276 thereof, the
off.er had to bo accepted in fiuhstautial compliance with those
conditions or not at all. [3b] 'rhe petition to compromise was at
worst only ambiguous. It cont:lincd the statement that the
trustel' "recomml'nded that if the S1l111 of $7500.00 was paid
over to the rrrustee herl'in in full and complete settlement, release, anddil;charge of the individual liability of said Frank
E. Raiter and Louis G. O'Leal'i to the creditors of the above
entitled bankrupt, your petitionrr would present to the court
a petition bnsed thereon to compromise the controversy." In
our own state c011rts it is estahli~hcd that an order is not void
on .its face although it is not iu accordance with the petition
on which it is based. (In ro 1I-toroho-use,(l917) 176 Cal. 634,
636 [169 P. 365] ; Estate of Gardiner,(1941) 45 Cal.App.2d
559,564 [114 P.2d 643].) Even if the question here is not
settled for us by the fact that the bankruptcy court delermined its own jurisdiction WI: must hold that the petition
was jurisdictionally adeqnate.
[6] In connection with the attack on the compromise proceedings, it is asserted that the trustee was entitled as of
course to compel the defendants to marshal their assets, and
on that premise plaintiff contends that there was no controversy to compromise. Such contention is devoid of merit;
substantially every fact disclosed in connection with the proceeding to marshal assets and to compromise the same belies it.
The mere fact that the trustee had the right as of course to
maintain the proceeding did not make the fact or amount of
net recovery for the partnership estate any less controversial.
The trial court in bankruptcy (the referee) had the ri!!.ht to
consider the uncertainty and cost of litigation· in .determiningthe advisability of compromise (lJetiiion of Stuart, (19~1,
6 Cir.) 272 F. 938, (41) and it also had the rir,ht to determine
the sufficiency of the petition upon which it act.ed (In re
L.M. Axle 00., (1!.125, 6 Ci~.) 3 F.2d 581, 5R2).
[3e] It is l'cgrettablo that the trustee in preparing the peti-
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tiQn,to cQInprpIllis~> l?~rInitted the ambi~i~i~Sl w~ch have b~en
~Q~ aP9.ve,,:~ appe~. '~ut those ambIgmtlcs did. not depr~ve
$,~J9Q;\:U't()fj~ ~llJ:'~Q.~!;tion to proceed. Not only~dthe plaIn~ls~igD.Qr,!t~ye .Jl,(>ti~eofthemeeting of c~editors and, ~f
~~.,~ourt; ~~I\l"~', QP.;,t~1'l petition to c?mpr~)Irusel but also. It
~t1;le"p.J;'!,~UIUe<l.~~4~t,;~he law took Its regular cour~e and
w;as., compl~eQ.J{»,:i~h".i.e.,that there was a final meetmg ?f
creditors bcfofEl th,\l" discharge of the bankrupt partnershlp
a~d.that in.compliance with subdivisions (13) and (14) of
8ubsectio~( (aJ .ofse(ltion 75, title 11, U.S.C.A. (§ 47, Bankr.
Act) the trustee did "make final reports and, file final accounts
with the !cQur1:$fifteeridays before the daysfixea for
thefinal.meeting o~thecreditors j and (14) lay before
the final meetings of the creditors detailed statements of the.
administration.of the estates." Another duty of trustees, pre"
scribed by section 75a(lO) is to "furnish such information
concerning the estates of which they are trustees and their
administration as maybe requested by parties in interest."
We are satistied that there was due process of law in the,
compromise pl10ceeding and that plaintiff is bound thereby.
Regardless of the form of the mesne proceedings' in the
bankruptcy court, or of irregularities or errors therein, the
controlling fact is that that' conrt had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties before it. It had jurisdiction
over the partnership as an entity, over its estate, over these
defendants as partners and as individnals, over their individual estates, and over all of the scheduled creditors of the
partnership. Its jurisdiction included the power to compromise
any eontroversy among the parties before it and to discharge
the defendants from lilibility to. the creditors of the bankrnpt firm. !
. [7] .Theproceedin~ to marshal ~ssets was instituted and the.
compromise' offer was made prior to the effective date o~ the
193!nuMlldmcnts. The law as it then existed was as much a
'part of that offer as though it had becn written therciri. (6
Cal.Juri. 3io,:§ 1R6; Brown v. Ferdon, (1936) 5 Ca1.2d 226,
231 [54 r.2d 712J ; Wing v. Forest Lawn Oem. Assn., (1940)
15 Ca1.2d 472, 476 [101 P.2d 1099, 130 A.L.R. 120J.) The
compromise offer involved substantive rights (see Brown v;
Ferdnn, supra), not mertl matters of remedy or procedure:
Not only \\ere the uefi;ndants' intercsts concerned, 1;lut so
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also were the interests of the bank which advanced the $7,500
and thejnterests of, the individual creditors ,Qf defendants.
[2b] The offer of compromise, it will be reialled,specified the
conditions on which the tendered. money cQul,4 'be used and
explicitly, reserved title in the bank pendi,ng fu,l:fill~ent of
thos.e conditions. It ~oncluded "Until an9. ljn.less saId composition shall be so effected, completed, and, cQrifirmation.thereof obtained, said sum of $7500.00 shall be and.remam the
property of the undersigned." If we. wer:e to hold tha~ t~e
subsequent amendments of 1938 deprIved the court, of JurIsdiction to approve the cOInpromise offer on the terms upon
which it was made we would in effect convict th~ trustee
of converting the money paid to him. th~fefer~e of Rllthorif;ing and directing such conversion, and the district court
judge of ratifying and approving such conversion. We think
such an application of the amendments would give them
an impracticable effect and that it would have been im-practicable for the bankruptcy refer,ee or judge to have so
applied them to the proceedings here involved.. Such pro"
ceedings therefore (upon the assumed hypothesis) constituted
'a proper case for actuation of the conditional saving clause
of the amendatory act hereinabove quoted. It is obvious, o,f
course, that if application of the 1938 -amendments to the
proceedings concerned would not deprive the . bankruptcy
court of its power to releru;e or discharge the defendants then,
notwithstanding applicability of the amendments, the questioncdordcrs would still remain valid.
[8] Our state courts give full faith and credit to the final
judgments and orders of the United States District Courts
(Code div. Proc., §1908; Bank of America.v. McLaughlin etc.
·00., (1~40) 40 Cal..A,pp.2d 620, 626"627 LI05 P .2d 607]),. f!,nd
"whc.:re the judgment Or d~cree of the Federal Court determiues a right under a Federal statute, that decision 'is final
uutil reversed in an appellate court or modified or set as.ide
in the CQurt of. its rendition '," (Stoll v. Gottlieb, (1938) 305
U.S. 1.65, 170 [59 S.Ot. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104;~08].} Further establishing the conclusiveness of the bankruptcy proceedings on
plaintiff in this state court action, we find in an opinion
delivered for the Supreme Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
the following statement of the law: "Apparently no question
of validity was .raised and the cause proceeded to decree on
the assUmption by all parties and the court itself that the

.' .
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was

.statute
·valid. Th~re was no attempt to review the decree.
If the gen~ralprinciples governing the defense of res judicata
are applieable, these bondholders, having the opportunity to
raise' the question of invalidity, were not the less bound· by
'the decree becaUse they failed to raise it....
"The argument isprcssed that the District Court was sitting as a court of bankruptcy, with the limited jurisdiction
'conferred by statute, and that, as the statute was later declared to be ,invalid, the District Court was with9utjurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and hence its decree is open
to collatetal' attack. We' think the argument untenabl~. The
:lower:fed~rarc0ll1'ts are all courts of limited jurisdiction,
that'~s, with~>nly the jurisdiction which Congress has' pre"
scribed. But none the less they are courts with au:thority,
when parties: arebroiight before them in accordance with the
;~equire:inents:of'due'process, to determine whether or. not they
~ave )uris,4~?t~on toent~rtain the cause and for thispri!pose
,to construe 'arid :apply the~ statute under which they are asked
'to ac~. ~!ieif.determinatioils of such questions, whlIe open to'
direct re~w:llIri.aynot be assailed' collaterally. "(Ohi~ot
'Ooullit'y l)ram~u.~'District v. Baxter State Bank, (19a9) 308
.;U;S; ,3?~i'~76 [t6,O,S~Qt. 317,8,4 L~Ed.329, 333] ; see, also, Bank
;O(~tn6ri!?,~,';Y,~,¥.~fa~¥h~i~ etc.O()., supra, (1940'jatp .. 627:.)
By expr~s definltl~n In the,banlq'uptcy act the word" coiirt"
"slJ.alrm~al1the 'judge or the referee of the court ~f bank.
.~picY}n;,which the pr~ceedings are pending." (§ 1(9), tit~i1,
"p';S.C;A'.Y'·")'
. '
'
, [9].. J'frisdiction is:\>ut the power to hear and determine
Ialid ,~OeS. '~rlo't ::dep'end'upon the correctness of the '.decislon
'iriad~;. ,~ q+qi/v.' H afh' (1928,) 203 Cal. 306, 315 1265 Pc., 246) , )
~tl01'~~:~:j'f~gIp.eD,t o~q~red, without a trialcanri()t be 'attacked,
:~o~,te,~~y '~is' ll~:,be~~; qeld (Ex p~rtf) BcnrMt~ (187~)44.
Qa.t'~4l: S,T;, Jokn$~onv., :'San Jj'ranci$Co Sav.1!ni,on, (1888)
[79:~aL:~3~(l39![16P~'7Jj,3, 7 /lm.St.Rep.129] rHollandv;
:S!,;p,erior';r:!ourt;'(-1932) 1210al.App. 523, 531 [9 P;2d531)).
(tliencertamly the, Qrd(!rof the bankruptcy court, made upon
.~the.<proc¢eding!il :hereinaboverelated, is not open' to coilliieral
; question;"J)Th,cre ha.s· been no suggcstion of extrinsic (or
iothe~), ffaud at any ~tage in the proceedings.
, ,Ftomwhat,h!1.$beensllid the conclusion is reached that plain,
,tiff h,ere ~. making a collateral attack on a final order and judg:ment Which, the U:nitedStates District Court had jurisdiction
.to make. Such attack fails.

[20] It is also to be noted that the releaRc of these defendants
depends not alone on the referee's order of February 14,
1939, and its implied approval by th(' district judge in making ,the order discharging the bankrupt firm and closing the
bankruptcy administration. The conclusion has been hereinabove developed that because of impracticability under the
facts the 1938 amendments relating to the discharge of unadjudicatcd partners did not apply to this case; at least it
would have been impracticable for the bankruptcy court to
have applied such amendments in this case if the application
thereof wouldbave precluded consummation of the compromise according to the terms of the offer made prior to the
effective date of such amendments. Upon the sam,e reasoning, ,if we were to conclude that the compromise order of
the referee was not in itself adequate to release the defendants from liability f()r .the firm debts Wf:' 1::iLlould still' be
bound, .for the pr~ervation of practicability of ~pplication.
to conclude thai the discharge of the partnership should be
entitled to the· effect it could have had before those amendments were enacted. As we ,have shown, there was then
respectable authority for holding that discharge of a partnership had the effect 6f discharging the partners from individual liapility for the discha,rged firm's debts. Therefore,
even .if there were otherwise some question as to the efficacy
of the .order' of compromise, in releasing these defendants
from the partnl.'rship debts, the doubt would be removed by
tb,eiproper (lri. the premises) effect given to the discharge of
the, ,fiJ,'m. Certainly the United States Pistl'ict Court judge
must be presumed to have concluded either that the referee's'
order was ,final and conclusive as to plaintiff's rights in the
premises against these defendants or that hiS own o,rder of
discharge of the partnership in bankruptcy operated to discharge .these defendants, as otherwise he would have been
approVing a conversion of the $7,500 belonging to the bank
which made the compromise offer. for defendants and would
have been closing the partnership bankl,'uptcy a~inistration
with no determination of the proceeding.to marshal defendants' assets.
Perhaps upon appeal, or other form of review in the fed-'
eral courts, it might have been held that the referee's order
of compromise and releasc was erroneous and that discharge
of the bankrupt firm did not operate to" discharge these defendants individually, but the state court is not a court of
review for proceedings in the federal bankruptcy court. It

"
I,,'

:"

i

'
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.,
4ppellrsirl,'~fragably from tht! uICrceu statement of fllcts and

tlie '~i1sidcrn.tionsstatcd ,above that the federal court con-

's~edit~' proc~pdjngs -inthl' prcmisl'~

t'ffieaeiutlS to relea!;c
~r Pischarge.~the ,defendants' from nllliability for partnership
debt,s. For us to 'confute thol'le procecdings hy holding that
~he 'federal Qonrt's _ordors are void as betwl'cn plaintiff and
defendants here wonld be t:mt.n.moullt to reviewing ana. re~
versing those orders.
,The jUdgmcnt'is affirmed.

.

:1.<;

,Gibson, C.J., Shenk, .J., and Curtis, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I disl'lent.
The opinion of the Di.strict Court of Appf>nl in this case
by ~residing .TustieePeters, modified in pllrt, sets fm·th t.he
reasonJ'l that lead me to conclude that the jndf,ment should
be reversed:
''',Where a partnership has Leen adjudicated a bankrupt
the individual assets of the general partners may be drawn
into the administration of the bankrnpt estate, a~d any surplus remaining after paying individual creditors j~ !tpplicable
to the partnership; debts. (Section 5g' of thp Bankruptcy
Act,11 U.S:C;A:; § 23g; Francis v. McNeill, 228 U.S. 695 [33
ROt; ,701,57"L:Ed. '1029, L.R.A. 191iiE, 706] ; G Remington
on ,Bankruptcy (4th Ed.), p. 499, 50:1.)"
• "The 1938 amendment added to section 5 of the BankruptcyAct, paragraph j;rcads as follows: 'The discharge
0'£' a partnership shaU not discharg'l' the individual general
partners thereof ,from the partnership dehts.' (11 U.S.C.A.,
§'23j.) Thaameildatory act contained the following provision: 'Except' as otherwisc provided in this amendatory
Act;, the provisions of this amendatory Act shall govern proceedings so far as practicable in cases pending when it takes
effect.' -(52 Stats., p. 940 ; see, In re Win. Akers, Jr. 00.,
Inc., 31 F.Supp"900.) In view of this provision section5j
(ll U.S.C.A." §23j) governs the intt'rpretation of the discharge herein.,. 'i'
,;UPr~or;to;·the -enactment of section 5j there was some
doubt as to whether a discharge of the partuership only had
the' effect; of~'discharging the individual liability of the partnersforthepartnershipdcbts. (Myers v. Intcrnatiollllll'rust
Ot1.;,: supra ; {273'·.U.S; 380, 47 S.Ct. 372, 71 L.Bd. G:J21; 7
ReJll,ington.Qn;Barikruptcy, (5th Ed.) p. 86:1; 8 C.J.S. 1546,
§ ~80;" 37, :Harv:L.Rev." 614.) The 1938 provision removed
this doubt. 't~J .~ l;', •.• , .. ! ;
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"The Act, prior to the 1938 amendment, provided only
two methods whereby a bankrupt 'could secure a dischargethe discharge granted following full administration in bankruptcy, and a discharge upon confirmation of a composition
of creditors. (Welles-Kahn Co. v. Klein, supra.) Under the
1938 amendment a discharge may be secured uponconfirmationof an ar.rangement. The right of a partner to secure
a discharge from individual liability to partnership creditors
where the bankrupt is a partnership is similarly limited.
The individual assets of a partner may be drawn into the
bankruptcy administration. The Act makes no provision
whereby one whose assets are subject to the jurisdiction of
the court in a bankruptcy proceeding may secure a discharge
from liability to creditors of the bankrupt in any other way.
(See In re Northampton Portland Oement Co., 185 F.542.)"
'In the present case, the alleged discharge of the liability
of the partners for partnership debts did not, follow from
full administration in bankruptcy., The majority opinion concludes, however, that although there was no composition or
arrangement plaintiff was bound by the referee's order discharging defendants from liability for partnership debts.
At the date of the order the bankruptcy' act provided: "The
receiver or trustee may, with the approval of the court, compromise any controversy arising in the administration of the
estate upon such terms as he may deem for the best interest
of the estate." (11 U.S.C.A., § 50.) Even if it be assumed
ihat the alleged dispute as. to whether or not liquidation of
the individual assets of defendants would yield any surplus
for partnership creditors could' be made the subject ofa
"compromise of controversy " under this section, the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to discharge the individual
liability of the partners to partnership creditors in proceedings brought, to compromise a controversy arising in the administration of the estate of the bankrupt partnership. (Ham~
ilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Ben L. Berwald Shoe Co., 10 F.2d
275.) The power of the trustee ofa bankrupt partnership
to seize and administer the assets of the individual partners
does not give the trustee power, to control the claims' of creditors against the partners individually. The creditor's right
to an in personam judgment against the partner is not, the
property of the partnership or' a right that can be enforced
by the partnership trustee. ,(First Nat. ~ank of Herkimer
v.Poland Union,109F.2d 54.)
,
are of the view that the referee's order of February

"We
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20, 1939, by which he purpQrted to. discharge Raiter and
Ol~ari:, f~Qmindividual liability for partnership debts was
VOId ,on Its, face fQr the reason that as an Qrder cQnfirming
a;cQmpo~itiQn ''!lllder sectiQn 12 of the Bankruptcy Act it
~as ~equlred to. be made by the judge, and CQuid nQt validly
,
be made by a referee. "
, ',' In the case herefu, while proceedings to bring the assets
Qf' the pa~tners' iJ;t~Q the bankruptcy were pending, Raiter
and Olearl Qff~:r~~$7,500 to. be applied in part payment Qf
the p~rtner'Sh~J?' '<?reditors' Qn cQnditiQn that they be released
~d4ischarge~irt,full,'frQm .individualliability to such credl~?r~:",.':l'~~;'.~Jl8.~olv,vas, essentlally Qne for a cQmposition. A
~?~PPSI,~lQn.?~, cred!i~Qrs~s ,a 'prQceeding, vQluntary QnbQth
Sl;des, b~ !'llICP .~~~.~~btor, Qf his Qwn motiQn, Qffers to. pay
his c:reditQr~;a ce~~l.1~ p~rcentage of their claims in exchang~
fQ1';a rele~se<;~r?~,,~l~ habilities.' (6 Am. JUl'. 776, § 41(),)
T~~ ',Qff~r.,~f CQIII.:p()sItlQ,n may be Qf a lump sum, as in the
c~~~h!e:rem~.J~n.'r~, Ihckmore ,Shoe 00., 263 F. 926.)
". A:comp?Slti~~ 'w~,en cQnfirmed Qperates as a discharge
~< ba,n)truPt~r:, :, !"Th,e . cQnfirmatiQn Qf a compQsitiQn shall
~~~~ar~e'}ll~:,~a~Pt frQm his debts, other than those
~~eed, to. be,·~~al ::t>r th,e te~s of the compositiQn and thQs.e
~.?~"aff~~t~d,]i -~, 'Psc~arge.. ~11 U.S.O.A. 32(c), see cases
(ll~ed: p. 133i Par' 631 ; for SImilar prQvision as to. arrangements, under. t~e}938' amendments see 11 U.S.O:A:§ 771;
~yers v; !"!ternat~o,npJTrust 00,:, 273 U.S. 380 (47 'S.Ot:
~72, 71~.~?:692); >'" Before ~QnfirmatiQn of the cQmposition
IS s.Qu~ht ,xt, 18 reqUlred that It .be accepted in writing by ~
maJQrlty lIl:;number, Qf all creditors whose claims, have been
allQwe.4. whlqhnumber must represent a majQrity in amount
pf claIms.(ll l!:S~?A:; §'30, §202.) Since a cQmpositiQn
~~en cQnfirriled ,IS bllldlng Qn creditQrs who. donQt assent;
It IS settled. that, there must be str~ct compliance with the statutQry re9u,lrements. (Inre Palmer, 2 F.Supp. 275, 277; In
re ,Ifre~r, 120 F. 978;8 O.J.S.1689.)
, Prl?~ to. the 1938 ~mendments to. the Bankruptcy Act,
CQmposltIOns were, prQvlded for by sectiQns 12 and 74. (11
U.S:O.A., § 30,§ 202.) Under the 1938 amendments these
~ectlons were supers~ded by prQvision fQr 'arrangements.'
(52 Stats. 8fO, enactIng' clause and chap. XI at p.905; 11
U.S.C.A., § 101, et seq.) The new prQcedure includes compositions in the term 'arrangements.' This is plain from
tp.c definition, as follQws: '" Arrangement" shall mean any
plan of a debtor fQr the settlement, satisfactiQn, Qr extensiQn
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Qf the time Qf payment Qf his unsecured debts, UPQn any
terms.' (11 U.S.C.A., § 706.) An arrangement 'is nQt required to. becQnfirmcd by the judge. Under the 1938 amendments referees are invested with jurisdictiQn, subject to. review by the judge, to 'cQnfirm Qr refuse to. cQnfirm arrangements Qr wage-earner plans, Qr set aside thecQnfirmatiQn Qf
arrangement Qr wage-carner plans and reinstate the proeeeding
Qr cases.' (11 U.S.C.A., § 66; see, also., 11 V.S.C.A., §§761-772,
prQvidingfQr cQnfirmatiQn by the 'cQurt,' but nQt requiring
eQnf40matiQnby the 'judge. ')
"These sectiQns are nQt applicable to. thisprQceeding. The
1938 amendments expresslyprQvide that sectiQns 12,73 and
74, as amended, 'shall cQntinue in full force and effect with
respect to. prQceedings pending under thQse sectiQnsuPQn the
effective date Qf this amendatQry Act.' (52Stats. p. 916;
n'U.S.O.A., § 799(3).) The cQmpQsitiQn in the present case
is referable to sectiQn'12. A cQmpQsitiQn under sectiQn 74
is initiated by the filing Qf a petitiQn Qr answer in which
the'debtQr states that he desires to. effect a cQmpQsitiQn, UpQn
the judge's apprQvi:a.g the petition the compQsitiQn prQceed.tug gQes fQrward with a meeting Qf .creditQrs and Qther fQrmalities. (11 U.S.C.A., § 202.) Such procedure was nQt fQllowed in the present case. A ,compQsitiQn under sectiQn 12
ori'ginates in an 'Qffer Qf cQmpQsitiQn.' (11 U.S.O.A., § 30;
Nassau Sm. &- Ref. Works v. Brightwood Bronze F. 00., 265
U.s. 269, 271 (44 S.Ot. 506, 68 L.Ed: 1013) ; Myers v.International Trust 00., 273 U.S. 380 [47 S.Ct.372, 71 L.Ed.
692] ; 8 O.J.S. 1688.) The Qffer in the present case was made
'on QrabQut June 28, 1938,' accQrding to. the agreed statementQf facts. The 1938 amendments were apprQved Qn June
22, 1938, and by terms Qf the amendatQry act went into. effect
three mQnths later, that is, Qn September 22, 1938. (52
Stats., p. 940.)
"By virtue Qf the express prQvisiQn Qf the amendatory
act abQve referred to., section 12 was applicable to. the pending prQceeding herein invQI ved. SectiQn 12 provides that
'the judge shall cQnfirm a cQmpQsitiQn.' (11 U.S.C.A., § 30;
In re Bloodworth-Ste·ntbridgo 00., 178 F. 372; In ro Everick
Art Oorp., 39 F.2d 765, 768.) When the act uses the term
'CQurt,' the referee may be included, but when the term
'judge' is used the referee is excluded.' (In re McMurray, 8
F.Supp. 449; 8 C.J.S. 976, 978; 2 RemingtQn Qn Bankruptey
(5th Ed.) 92.) SectiQn 1 Qf the act provides: '" J lldge"
shall mean a judge Qf a CQurt Qf bankruptcy, nQt including
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the referee~', (11 U.S.C.A., § 1, subd. 16; subd. 20 under
',the section as amended in 1938.)
." The judge's subsequent order of discharge does not
operate as a release of the individual liability of the partners for, the partnership debts. The discharge was of the
partnership. It was provided therein that 'Elba' Oil Company, a .copartnership composed of Joseph E. Barrett, J. S.
Lees,Louis.Oleari and F., E. Raiter, be discharged from all
,debts and claims which are made provable by said Acts
against its estate, and which existed on the 31st day of Detl'~ber,: ~. I)~ 1937;, 0rt wh~ch day the petition for adjudica~tp'~ "was file!! :against It; excepting such debts as, are by law
,~~;Pted fro,m the. operation of a discharge in bankruptcy.' "
" ')' There appear:. to be other defects in the proceeding
-viewed as a composition, .in addition to the absence of con:1,irmation by ,the: ju~ge. Where the offer of composition is
::nmde. by partners of a partnership adjudicated bankrupt
.it 'should not be:made .until after the schedule of individual
assets and, liEibilities as well as of partnership assets U; on
file~ (In re faZmer,2 F.Supp. 275, 277.) This is because
the creditors in d~termining whether it is to their advantage
,to, assent to an offer of composition should have full information as to assets available to satisfy their claims. Any
surplus of individual assets after paying individual debts
,may be used to pay partnership claims. In the present case
the offer was made while proceedings to compel the partners
,to file. ili,eir s~hedli1.es were still pending and before individual
.schedules had bee;n filed.
. . ~'TJ?e n.o~i~ to. creditors was of a petition praying for
,~charge of ,the li~l;>ility of the partners Raiter and Oleari
"ito .creditors who had filed claims, whereas the order of the
$~fereeenter.~q. o:q., th~,Iietition discharges them from any and
all liability which'· :might exist against either of them as
,p,~n~rs.,. ..",.~ ....,
'
'
.i;ll"~~~C, ih,~ptcy,papers included in the present record
~o ·~R}V,~.fail:ure,tQcomply with the requirement that be;~~fe; c.onfipr;J.~~i<?n,is sought' the composition must have been
:)tlqqept~a,)~." wri#:;ng by a majority of the creditors: . (11
J1~~q.A"'§I~O~L ::r~he, ~ppnrcnt reason for these omissions
liWiM. b~ j ~iscru.;~ed, ~~rell.f~er; It is not necessary' to determi;ne
&V~El~r.;th~e,~11'~gularities singly or together would render
,,tMll~9mpositiori,void asa ~ischarge. It is clear that, 'where
<t4e;~c~reqtlir~s t)le,judge ~oconfirm a composition, confirma~ -:...~9p'-:}'/;lY,,~ ,~fet~e",a, sll:b.o~d}.nate officialof the court, is of no
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legal effect. Such confirmation is void on its face as to
creditors who did not particip'ate in the composition. Th.e
composition is binding, however, ,as a common law composF
tion, on those who participated in it. (In r~ Clarence A.
Nachman Co., 6 F.2d 427; Paris Medicine Co. v. Lusby, 174
Ark. 749 (297 S.W. 1015) ; WeUes-Kahn Co. v. KZein, 81 Fla.
,
.
524, 527 C8S SO. 315) ; 8 C.J.S. 1688.)
"The fact that plaintiff's assignor had not filed a claun
in the bankruptcy proceeding does not bar it or its assignor
from attacking the void order of confirmation. The offer of
composition was made on' June 28, 1938. The adjudicatio~
tcio~ place on January 4, 1938. Henc~, the offe: of CO~P?SI
tion was made within six months' perIod followmg adJudIca-,
tion of bankruptcy, in which claims are required to be filed.
(11 U.S.C.A., § 93n; 44 U.S. Stilts. 666, amending § 57 of
the Bankruptcy Act.) The claim of pla~ntiff's assignor was
listed in the partnership schedules filed. An offer of com~
position should extend' to all creditors whose claims are,
listed by the bankrupt. (8 C.J.S. 1689, 1692; 7 Rem. (4th
Ed.) pp. 196,238; 8 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.), pp.
959,1237,1238; Nassau Smelting d7 Refining Works v. Bright.
wood Bronze F. Co .• 265 U.S. 269 (44 S.Ot. 506, 68 L.Ed.,
1013) ; In re Adamson, 83 F.2d 211.) Thus it has b~:n held,
that where the bankrupt makes an offer of coinposItIOn be~
fore the time to file claims has passed, creditors whose claims
are scheduled. by the bankrupt need not make proof of claims
to share in the compolilition. (Nassau Smelting d7 Refining
Works, supra.)
"It should be noted that the terms of the offer of composition here involved' did not confine it to creditors who had
claims'" nor did the referee's order of approval so limit
filed
.
it: But the trustee's interpretation of the offer evidently was
that payment should be made only to those who had proved
claims since he prayed in his petition that Raiter and Oleari
be rel~ased from invidual liability to creditors who had filed
claims. In any event, no payment was made to plaintiff's
as.,signor, nor did ii in any way participate in the composition proceedings. In the circumstances the void order. of
confirmation did not operate as to ,it to discharge theindi,
vidu~l liability of the general partners Raiter and Oleari. .
"It appears that the failur.e. to follow the procedure pre.
scribed for a composition was due to the fact that the matter
~as handled as a 'compromise of controversy.' The act pro·
vides: "The 'receiver or trustee may, with the approval of
,
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,the court, compromise any controversy arising in the admin, ,istration of' the estate, upon such terms as he may d,eem for
!hc' bcstinter~st of the estate/ (11 U.S.C.A;, § 50,; 2 RemIngton on :I3~nkruptcy'(5thEd.) p. 717; 8 C.J.S. 10~2.) Since
~~:p,rovalof' the' court, ':rather than of the 'judge' is req1l:1re4, approval, of, a 'compromise may be given ~y:the referee.
"'''But that which is' B.s::amatter of law a composition may
not ,be ,accol;llp}i,shed withoutcOInplying ~ith the statutory
'F;e~~ireme:nts'2'#,der;h~gtiiseofbeing a compromise of con~r,o~,e~y.; .,7h1ss~~t,t~~« §'27; ll1J'S,~,~" § 50) .should not
H~.(,lon!use~,w'lth"se~tlOI).'12'on composItIons. Itls"intended
~2:~~URR~!~:~:~~.N~i~~p'\;~~d:.ilicxpensivc, way of ,settling "ques.t..I()n,.s,a;t:ism~Plt tM'·1l:<l.tii1nlstratioIi of bankrupt estates. Itis
"m6st'ihfteri~~ed; 'hi:connection with contests on claims filed
a.~ain,.stthe eState,; 'or"the contested collections of claims due
the 'estate.'ltcanIiot;' of' course,be resorted to where the
mat~er in ,9ontroyersy is the right to a discharge.' (Gilbert's
C?)her ohBankr~ptcy' (one vol., 4th Ed.), p. 570.)
HA c'c~mpromiseof controversy' implies a diSpute to be
settled~ . Int~ecaseherein the papers in the bankruptcy
proceedmgwhich have been made part of the record in the
'preseIit. case' show a dispute as to whether certain persons
w:ho claimed to be limited partners were in fact general partners. But there is no intimation of any dispute as to the
status of" the four general partners, including Raiter and
Oleari. The trustee's petitions described them as general
partners and the stipulation of facts upon which the pres'Elnt :actionwas heard so describes them.
'
"The petition to compromise recites that it is doubtful
that the estate can realize from marshaling of the indi-'
'riduEilassets of Raiterand Olearia greater sum than they
offered to pay,' that is, $7,500, and that 'there is also some
doubt as to the ability of your Trustee to prevail in the said
proceeding to marshal the assets of the said Frank E.Raiter
an'd.l.iouis G. Oleari." However, as to general partners the
aut40~'ity of t~e trustee to marshal assets to the end of
applying an;ysurplus remaining after paying individual debts
topartnershj:pobHgations exists as a matter of right, unless,
perhaps, where it app(,al'S unlikely that any surplus above
in,<llvidual debts will,rpsult. It would seem, therefore, that
ollthe ,record the only dispute which could exist was whether
liquidation ,of the individu~l. assets of Raiter and Oleari
would" yield any surplus for partnership creditors. In our
view such a' dispute may not be made the subject of a com-
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promise of controversy which will result in discharge of
general partners from individual liability' to partnership
creditors. ' ,
.
,"To summarize-the court in bankruptcy was wlth.out
'jurisdiction to discharge the individual li!1~ility of RaI~er
and Olearias general partuers except follo."'.mg full ad~m
istration 'in bankruptcy or upon compOSItIon proceedIllgs
which met the statutory requirements. The referee's or~er
was void a~ it discharge of the indivi.d~al liabili~ of Ralter
and Oleari. It was void as a compOSItIon of credlt~rs under
,section 12 ~I the Act because it lacked confirmatIo.n bya
judge., The provision for comp:on;ti~eof' c.on~r~versies does
hot authorize a discharge of the mdlvldual babllityof a partner to partnership creditors."
Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 18450. In Bank. Nov. 2, 1942.]

WILLIAM O. GAMBLE, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et aI., Respondents.
[1] Physicians - Licenses - Educational RequiremeD:ts - Osteopaths.-Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2493, as amended m 1941, ~e
quiring osteopaths to submit, with ~he annual tax and regIStration fee, evidence of the completlOnof 30 hours. of educa~
tiomil work is not unreasonable, although there IS no such
requirement' applicable to phys~?ians an~ surgeons. The Osteopathic Act (Stats. 1923, p. XCIllj Deermg's Gen. La~s, 19.23,
Act 5727) does not prohibit the Legislature from ~~osmg
varying requirements on osteopaths and oth~r ~rll;ct~tlOners
after its adoption as before, so long as the JurlsdlCtIons of
the Board of Medical Examiners and the Board of Osteopathic Examiners are not disturbcd.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel issuance of receipt
for annual tax and registration fee. Writ denied.
[1] See 20 Ca1.Jur. 1060 j 41 Am. Jur. 166.
McK. :o~. B,eference: [1] Physicians and Surgeons, § 15.

